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Aircraft

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  1. Describing an aircraft
  2. Preflight inspection
  3. Upgrading to Captain on an Embraer 145
  4. Boeing vs. Airbus
  5. Airbus A380
    1. Clcik on the image to get a 3D tour of the cockpit
    2. Commented tour of the A380 cockpit
    3. But things are not always what they seem to be
    4. The uncontained engine failure by Captain Fantastic
  6. Airbus A350
  7. Airbus A340
    1. A340 - Cockpit and Cabin 360º
    2. A340-500 HGW introduced by her captain on a flight to Heathrow
  8. Airbus A 318
  9. Boeing B727
    1. B727-22F   (360º)
    2. B727 landing without nose gear
    3. B 727 during the Vietnam war
    4. B727 - Virtual cockpit
    5. B727 - Description and checklists
  10. Boeing B737
    1. B737 explained
    2. B737 NG - Cockpit preparation
    1. 360º
    2. How it is built
    1. Continental Air Lines 75th Anniversary Nova "Pintura Retro"!!! 
    2. History
    3. Interesting Facts
    4. Short field Performance
  11. Boeing B747
    1. Boeing B747-01 - Cockpit 360º
    1. Boeing 747
    2. Joe Sutter, the father of the Jumbo
  12. Boeing B767
    1. Boeing 767- Cockpit and Cabin 360º
  13. Boeing - The making of Florida One
  14. Boeing 777
    1. Learning Lessons from Asiana Flight 214
  15. Boeing 787 - Dreamliner
    1. 360º in flight
  16.  Bombardier C Series
  17. Concorde
    1. In 1976, no cell phone, no glass cockpit, no jetbridge, but what a bird!
    2. Concorde Cockpit 360º
    3. Concorde - Cabin 360º
  18. BombardierCRJ 700 - 360º
  19. Cessna Citation XLS - 360º
  20. Cirrus SR 22X - 360º
  21. De Havilland Comet - 360º
  22. More 360º
    1. Mustang
    2. AN-2
    3. Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ700
    4. MIG-21 YB
    5. DC3 Dakota
    6. IL-76
    7. Junkers JU 52
    8. Extra 300 Acrobatic
  23. F 100-NG
  24. Flying the Airbus A380 - Pilot Report
    1. ATR 72-600
          1. ATR presents ATR 72-600 prototype
    2. Boeing 787 wing flaw extends inside plane
    3. Fly KLM in an  MD-11
    4. 787 flight tests to remain suspended; onboard fire caused loss of primary electrical power
    5. Boeing - The making of Florida One
    6. Some history of the JET ENGINE
    7. The future of flight
    8. An airplane with no window??
    9. A cockpit with no window??

     

    Describing an aircraft

    Clicking on the picture below will lead you to more illustrated vocabulary

     

     

     

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    Preflight inspection

     

    Upgrading to Captain on an Embraer 145

    Ever want to know what it takes to upgrade to Captain at the airlines. Upgrading to Captain is one of the more challenging events in a pilots flying career. The transition to flying as first officer to pilot in command is more than a simple checkride. The process of becoming a Captain takes weeks of hard work and study.

    If you are curious what it takes to upgrade to Captain we will describe the process and give you advice on how to prepare for the upgrade training and how to pass your check ride.

     

    If you listen to the podcast you will hear how they discuss the features of different kinds of aircraft.

     

    Podcast: Play in new window | Download

    Today I am with Len Costa a newly minted airline Captain. Len is also the publisher of The Piot Report.com and is Host of The Stuck Mic Avcast. Len and I discuss:

    • Flying the Embraer 145
    • The upgrade process
    • How to prepare for upgrade training
    • What are some of the common causes for upgrade training failure.
    • Advice on how to prepare mentally for the training and the check ride.

    Visit http://www.aviationcareerspodcast.com/10 for show notes and to Subscribe;

     

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    Boeing vs. Airbus

    I'm often asked if pilots consider one model "better" or "safer" than the other. The long answer to this question would require nuanced comparisons between autoflight systems, fly-by-wire technology and the like -- once again, for most of you, a wholly boring conversation. The short and perfectly acceptable answer is no. Both planes have their own pleasant or annoying idiosyncrasies, and although there might be some merit to the argument that Airbus relies too heavily on automation -- under certain conditions, Airbus flight control software precludes manual inputs from the crew entirely -- we'll eventually wind up at a statistical stalemate. In conventional wisdom, Airbus is the more "controversial" player, but both plane-makers have endured scandals and controversies, from the air data sensor malfunction that may have played a role in the 2009 Air France disaster (Airbus), to the rudder design problems that caused at least two fatal 737 crashes (Boeing).

    "If it's not a Boeing, I'm not going," reads a sticker you'll sometimes see on pilots' flight cases or on the bumpers of their cars. It's a cute rhyme, but don't read too much into this.

    A Boeing is a Boeing; an Airbus is an Airbus ... but not. Even those aircraft within the same "family" can be vastly different from one another.

     

    Read the complete article here and some comments here. (This is the kind of comparison you might have to make during the Santos-Dumont assessment)

     

     

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    Airbus A380

    Clcik on the image to get a 3D tour of the cockpit

     

    Commented tour of the A380 cockpit

     

    But things are not always what they seem to be

     

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    The uncontained engine failure by Captain Fantastic

    KARL STEFANOVIC: Is the A380 safe?

    RICHARD DE CRESPIGNY: Absolutely. This was the biggest testament to Airbus. Some people might think the aircraft collapsed under the onslaught, but no aircraft is ever designed to take the beating that this aircraft got. The wing was cluster-bombed. The aircraft had phenomenal damage in all systems, and it didn't just recover, it performed brilliantly. It is indestructible.

    Watch this documentary and follow the transcription.

     

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    Airbus A350

     

     

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    Airbus A340

    A340 - Cockpit and Cabin 360º


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    A340-500 HGW introduced by her captain on a flight to Heathrow

     

     

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    Airbus A 318

     

     

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    Boeing B727

     

    B727-22F   (360º)

     

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    B727 landing without nose gear

     

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    B 727 during the Vietnam war

    World Airways Evacuation From Da Nang To Saigon 1975 from PhuongBui on Vimeo.

     

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    B727 - Virtual cockpit

     

    B727 - Description and checklists

    Click here to know all about this beauty.

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    Boeing B737

    B737 explained

    B737 NG - Cockpit preparation

    Some information about Short Field Performance

    Here's a Management Reference Guide

     

     

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    360º

    Inside the Boing 737-200 in Ecuador

     

    How it is built

     

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    Continental Air Lines 75th Anniversary Nova "Pintura Retro"!!! 

    Since the first flight of the Boeing 737-100 in April 1967 more than 6,000 examples of this hugely successful short-medium-range aircraft have been ordered, making it easily the best selling commercial airliner in history.

     

    Today, the 737 represents more than 25% of the worldwide fleet of large commercial jet airliners.

     

    Three main versions have been produced, the 737-100/-200, powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines, the 737-300/-400/-500, introducing high bypass ratio CFM56 turbofans and more advanced avionics, and the Next Generation 737-600/-700/-800, delivered to the first customer in December 1997.

     

    History

     

    Faced with fast-growing competition in the short-haul jet market in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Boeing began design of the 737 in November 1964.

     

    The 737 was finally launched in 1965 with an order for 22 aircraft from Lufthansa, but the programme was then almost cancelled and sold off to Japan for lack of funds.

     

    The first major development of the 737 came in November 1981 with launch of the re-engined 737-300 with orders from Southwest Airlines and USAir. The 126-seat Next Generation 737-700 was launched in November 1993 and was followed by the 737-800 in 1994, the 737–600 in 1995 and the 737–900 in 1999.

     

    Interesting Facts

     

    The Boeing 737 has been sold to more than 540 airlines and on average there are 1,250 in the air at any one time.

     

    Short field Performance

     

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    Boeing B747

    Boeing B747-01 - Cockpit 360º

     

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    Boeing 747

     

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    Joe Sutter, the father of the Jumbo

     

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    Boeing B767

    Boeing 767- Cockpit and Cabin 360º

     

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    Boeing - The making of Florida One

     

     

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    Boeing 777

    Learning Lessons from Asiana Flight 214

    Posted byGuy Norris12:14 AM on Jul 08, 2013

     

     

    While the NTSB investigation into the July 6 crash of an Asiana Airlines Boeing 777-200ER at San Francisco focuses in on the actions of the crew, safety experts are already learning valuable new design lessons from the violent crash landing.

    Structurally the key early lesson appears to be that the aircraft’s fuselage did extremely well, and remained substantially intact throughout the initial impact and subsequent ground loop. Although the forward two-thirds of the fuselage was gutted by the post-crash fire, the overall structural integrity of the fuselage was not compromised by the impact with significant buckling only evident in two zones, forward of the wing root and aft by Section 47/48 where the empennage was ripped from the rest of the airframe.

     

    Read much more about it on Aviation Week

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    Boeing 787 - Dreamliner

    360º in flight

     

     

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     Bombardier C Series


     

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    Concorde

    In 1976, no cell phone, no glass cockpit, no jetbridge, but what a bird!

    Concorde Cockpit 360º

     

    Concorde - Cabin 360º

     

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    BombardierCRJ 700 - 360º

     

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    Cessna Citation XLS - 360º

     

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    Cirrus SR 22X - 360º

     

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    De Havilland Comet - 360º

     

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    More 360º

    Mustang

    AN-2

    Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ700

    MIG-21 YB

    DC3 Dakota

    IL-76

    Junkers JU 52

    Extra 300 Acrobatic

     

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    F 100-NG

     

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    Flying the Airbus A380 - Pilot Report

    By: Robert Mark

    June 18, 2009

     

    Aircraft

     

    Airbus engineers are never satisfied, and customers of the European airframe builder should have only one response: thank goodness. While many point to the A380’s size as the achievement of which they are most proud–a maximum takeoff weight of roughly 1.2 million pounds and room for 525 passengers in typical long-haul configuration–the leviathan also incorporates radical new systems including brake-to-vacate (BTV), designed to reduce significantly the time an aircraft spends on the runway, overrun protection, and a new TCAS conflict resolution system, which the company believes will increase safety by a factor of two. 

     

    AIN reporter Robert Mark had a rare opportunity to fly the aircraft ahead of the Paris Air Show and here he shares insights into what its new technology actually delivers.

    The cockpit of the A380 is massive by any measure, with some two-and-a-half feet of space between the two pilots once they’re seated. In addition to three jump seats, we had as many as seven people moving about behind us in flight after we switched off the seatbelt signs.

     

    With several pilots planning to try their hand at the A380, the plan was to demonstrate the brake-to-vacate to each of us, then land and switch seats during the taxi back to Runway 32L at Toulouse. Takeoff weight was calculated as 846,575 pounds, considerably below the maximum of just over 1.2 million pounds.

     

    The engines, started two at a time, are so far aft of the cabin that the gauges are the only indication of what is happening in the back. Even with the engines running, the noise level in the A380 cockpit was no more than in a regular automobile with the windows rolled up.

     

    Taxiing the A380 is not nearly the challenge I had anticipated. The aircraft is equipped with two video cameras, one built into the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer and another under the belly a few feet behind the nose gear. Calling up each on the pilot’s multifunction display makes it easy to use the tiller to keep the nose gear on the centerline. With the outer main gear trunnions separated by just 46 feet–a footprint only slightly wider than that of a 747-400–the pilot will find it easy to nail the centerline.

     

    V1 was calculated as 127 knots, VR 130 and V2 as 136, so any decision to abort would be problematic. In this configuration, however, the A380 would fly even if two engines quit on takeoff.

     

    The Flight Plan

    The day’s flight plan called for each demo pilot to take the left seat to view a demonstration of the updated TCAS, which was programmed with enough pseudo targets to fool the A380’s conflict system and trigger the automated response. The final landing of the day was planned as an all-out maximum braking effort to demonstrate what a pilot might experience should he ignore the computer’s call of “runway too short” and “land anyway,” or possibly during an emergency arrival.

    Since that effort would produce maximum brake heating, there would be only a single demonstration, with all the guest pilots observing from the jump seats.

    The strangest part of flying a very large aircraft is the loss of a degree of depth perception and a relation to speed. On takeoff, I brought the thrust levers up about one quarter, to be certain the four massive Rolls-Royce Trent 900 turbofans were stabilized for acceleration. But there was precious little sense of acceleration–some force pushed me back in the seat as I moved the levers to takeoff power, but not as much as I had expected, as I steered with the tiller to remain on the runway centerline.

     

    Despite the diminished sensation of acceleration, the A380 reached V1 in what seemed like no more than 10 seconds and rotation speed shortly thereafter. Looking out through the expansive cockpit windows, it seemed we were too slow to fly, but rotate we did with a slight pull on the side stick to reach a 15-degree pitch angle. The A380 virtually leapt off the ground. At positive rate, I called for gear up and soon we were accelerating to 200 knots for the brief demonstration flight. I tried some 30- to 40-degree-bank turns before leveling off at 3,000 feet, and was amazed at how easy the three-quarter-million-pound-plus aircraft was to maneuver with simply a few movements of my left wrist.

     

    Now level, I punched the autopilot on so I could pay close attention to the brake-to-vacate demonstration by senior vice president of safety Claude Lelaie.

    Summoning the correct page on the multifunction display is easy thanks to the trackball that rests at a comfortable position beneath the pilot’s right hand. We selected S-8 at Toulouse–2,300 meters down–as our exit point for the first time around, which meant that if I was on the mark, we would have about 7,500 feet to stop the aircraft and turn off.

     

    The key is to set autobrakes to auto and let the system figure out the rest. The pilot is expected to add maximum reverse and keep the aircraft on the centerline but do nothing else until 10 knots, at which speed the system will automatically disconnect.

    Even with the autopilot off, the A380 was extremely light and easy to control down the ILS to touchdown. Once on the ground for the first landing, I pulled the reversers out and stayed on the pedals but off the brakes. The giant aircraft slowed until I disconnected the system about 10 feet from the S-8 intersection.

     

    Runway Overrun Protection

    Another test involved trying the runway overrun protection system by creating an artificially short runway in the flight management system. On short final, the technology calculated the touchdown zone and, based on our speed, concluded we’d never get it stopped. On short final at about 200 feet, it began yelling “runway too short” in a tone that was clear in its urgency. This would be the signal for a pilot to go around.

     

    The final landing was a maximum-performance arrival targeting the closest intersection possible at Toulouse, S-6, approximately 5,413 feet from the start of the runway. Once the A380 was programmed, another pilot this time flew to short final, crossing the fence at ref speed. After touching down, he called for maximum reverse while the A380 worked the brakes. The first five seconds were exciting as the aircraft decelerated rapidly, and everyone in the cockpit applauded as we easily made S-6. Brake temperatures never exceeded 400 degrees C. On a low-visibility landing, it would have made for an impressive demonstration as well.

     

    As a point of reference, the A380 uses reverse thrust on only the two inboard engines because of the aircraft’s vast wingspan. Engines one and four might well be so close to the outside edges of the runway, or even hanging outside the concrete area, that Airbus worried about FOD damage to those outer powerplants when in reverse.

     

    During the TCAS demonstration, we climbed to FL100 in the Airbus practice area near Toulouse. With the aircraft fully coupled to the flight director and autopilot, TCAS traffic targets were generated by the A380 software significant enough to allow the aircraft to follow the commands. At the first sign of traffic, the system displayed a TCAS alert light to advise the crew that, should the target become a resolution advisory (RA), it would automatically move our airplane out of the way using the autopilot and autothrottles.

     

    When the traffic became an RA, the power came up and the airplane smoothly entered a climb to match the TCAS command, much faster than a pilot would. But the most important element was how smoothly the autopilot/flight director combination made the aircraft climb, and how smoothly the A380 returned to its original altitude when clear of traffic. Another TCAS demo demanded the aircraft first descend and then almost immediately climb back to avoid another aircraft beneath us. The airplane certainly performed these maneuvers more smoothly than a human could have done.

     

    Airbus firmly believes that maneuvering a big aircraft with pilot muscle power is no longer a good use of resources–especially since Airbus computers can take much of the mental gymnastics out of the equation, giving pilots more time for big-picture decisions. BTV is sure to be in the vanguard of efforts to increase runway capacity, with runway overrun protection evolving as a valuable corollary to the thinking process in Toulouse. The notion that the autopilot can resolve TCAS conflicts better than a hand-flying pilot is so simple that one wonders why it took this long to come to fruition.   

     

    Read the original on AIN Online

     

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    ATR 72-600

    ATR presents ATR 72-600 prototype

    Friday October 2, 2009

     

    Exactly two years after ATR announced the launch of its -600 series, the manufacturer officially presented its first ATR 72-600 prototype at a ceremony in Toulouse yesterday.

    The prototype -600 (converted from an ATR 72-500) started its flight test campaign in July 2009 after being powered on in December 2008. The aircraft is fitted with new Pratt & Whitney 127M engines.

    "The new -600 series has been designed to improve the performance of our aircraft in terms of fuel consumption and engine power, maximum takeoff load and reduction of maintenance costs," CEO Stephane Mayer said yesterday. ATR officials stated that development of both the ATR 72-600 and ATR 42-600 is progressing according to schedule.

    The power-on of the first new-build -600, which will be an ATR 42-600, is planned for December with flight trials starting soon after. Entry into service of the first commercial ATR 72-600s and ATR 42-600s is planned for 2011. The first airline scheduled to take delivery of the new type is Royal Air Maroc. Currently, ATR has orders for 59 -600 series aircraft comprising five 42-600s and 54 72-600s.

    The company declined to reveal its investment in the -600 series. "We have the full support of our shareholders [EADS and Alenia Aeronautica each hold 50%]," Senior VP-Operations Luigi Lombardi told this website. He added that breakeven will be reached with 150 sold aircraft.

    Both models of the -600 series will have the new PW127M engines, which ATR claims will provide 5% additional thermodynamic power at takeoff, as well as a new Thales avionics suite with a glass cockpit flight deck featuring five LCD screens and a new multipurpose computer. The avionics integrate an autopilot that will be CAT IIIA-certified. A two-class cabin still under development will feature larger overhead bins and improved "space perception."

     

    by Cathy Buyck

     

     

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    Boeing 787 wing flaw extends inside plane

    By Dominic Gates

    Seattle Times aerospace reporter

     

    The wing damage that grounded Boeing's new composite 787 Dreamliner occurred under less stress than previously reported — and is more extensive. An engineer familiar with the details said the damage happened when the stress on the wings was well below the load the wings must bear to be federally certified to carry passengers.

    In addition, information obtained independently and confirmed by a second engineer familiar with the problem shows the damage occurred on both sides of the wing-body join — that is, on the outer wing as well as inside the fuselage.

     

    The structural flaw in the Boeing design was found in May during a ground test that bent the wings upward. Stresses at the ends of the long rods that stiffen the upper wing skin panels caused the fibrous layers of the composite plastic material to delaminate. The damage at the end of each of the 17 long stiffening rods, called stringers, on each wing's upper skin happened just beyond the aircraft's "limit load," which is the maximum load the wing is expected to bear in service.

     

    Last week, The Seattle Times mistakenly reported that the damage occurred later in the test, just beyond "ultimate load." That is defined as 50 percent higher than the in-service limit load and is the Federal Aviation Administration's test target. The tearing at the end points of the stringers well before the wing reached ultimate load means the problem is worse than suggested in last week's story.

     

    Because the wing test fell short of the ultimate load target, the plane could have flown only under restrictions that would have severely limited the usefulness of a test flight.

    It also helps explain why Boeing canceled the first flight planned for the end of June.

     

    The fact that there is corresponding damage on the fuselage side of the wing join adds to the complexity of any fix and the time and cost involved in implementing it.

    The wings of the 787 are made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan.

     

    Inside the fuselage, on the other side of where each wing joins the jet's body, there is a structure called the "center wing box," made by Fuji Heavy Industries, also in Japan.

    This center box is constructed much like the outer wing, with composite-plastic skin panels stiffened by composite-plastic stringers. The stringers on the fuselage side mate at the wing join, fitting with those on the wing side. Because the wings are designed to transfer the loads into the fuselage box, the damage that occurred in the test was mirrored on either side of the join. Though a single fix, once designed and tested, will work on both sides of the join, mechanics performing the necessary modifications inside the airplanes already built will have to duplicate the work inside the wing and inside the fuselage.

    According to the engineers, Boeing is focusing on a solution that will require mechanics to create a U-shaped cutout in the end of each upper wing-skin stringer.

    This would have the effect of transferring part of the excess load into the titanium fitting at the wing-body join instead of into the wing skin. The mechanics must then fasten the reshaped stringer ends with newly designed parts to the titanium fitting. The goal is to reduce the stress-point loads enough to prevent future delamination. The delamination of the composite-plastic material isn't likely to lead to catastrophic failure of the airplane, but it would require constant monitoring and potentially costly repairs by the airlines. Any tear would have to be promptly fixed to prevent it from spreading.

     

    The way the stringers terminate and mate at the join, the focus of the problem, is Boeing's responsibility and not that of its Japanese partners. Boeing will have to pay for the cost overruns. Engineers will have to validate Boeing's chosen solution in tests before they modify the wings and center wing boxes already built. Company spokeswoman Yvonne Leach said 10 Dreamliners have been completed, including two ground-test airplanes. About 30 more are in various stages of production.

     

    The Dreamliner is already two years late. CEO Jim McNerney said last week that a new schedule for first flight and delivery will be ready within the next two months. Estimates by the two engineers of the minimum time needed to fix the problem suggest the plane is now unlikely to fly until next year. Until the new production timetable is announced, Wall Street analysts are unable to calculate the precise additional cost of this latest delay.

     

    Analyst Joe Campbell, of Barclays Capital, this week downgraded Boeing's stock. He cited an increased risk that the company will book a large accounting loss this year to cover the extra expense of the repeated delays. In a note to clients, Campbell estimated the total cost overrun of the Dreamliner program so far — extra startup and engineering costs, penalties owed to customers for delivery delays and contractual obligations to suppliers for engineering changes — as "in the vicinity of $11 billion." Because 850 Dreamliners have already been ordered, Campbell still believes the jet can be "highly profitable" over two decades of full production. But with that level of cost overrun, Campbell said, "Boeing is highly likely to lose large sums of money on the first 400 to 600 aircraft."

    Dominic Gates

     

      

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    Fly KLM in an  MD-11

    Sit back and enjoy it.

     

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    787 flight tests to remain suspended; onboard fire caused loss of primary electrical power

    By Aaron Karp and Perry Flint | November 11, 2010

     

     

     

    787 tail. Photo: Courtesy, Boeing.

    The 787 flight test program will remain suspended as Boeing works to understand the causes of an onboard electrical fire to aircraft ZA002 on Tuesday that led to a loss of primary electrical power (ATW Daily News, Nov. 10).

    In an update released Wednesday, Boeing said that "backup systems, including the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine, functioned as expected and allowed the crew to complete a safe landing." According to the company, the pilots "at all times had positive control of the airplane and all of the information necessary to perform that safe landing."

    Initial inspection appears to indicate that "a power control panel in the aft electronics bay will need to be replaced on the aircraft." Flight data has been retrieved and is being analyzed but "the process will take several days," Boeing said, adding that, "The team was conducting monitoring of the Nitrogen Generation System at the time of the incident but there is no reason to suspect that the monitoring or earlier testing of that system had anything to do with the incident."

    Boeing said it "cannot determine the impact of this event on the overall program schedule until we have worked our way through the data. Teams have been working through the night and will continue to work until analysis is complete and a path forward is determined."

    The manufacturer in August delayed the Dreamliner program for the seventh time when it pushed back first delivery to ANA to mid-first quarter 2011 (ATW Daily News, Aug. 27). It is unclear how this latest setback will affect the program.

    Bernstein Research, which has accurately forecast previous delays in the 787 program, said that the incident is "serious" even if the other five flight test Dreamliners return to flying quickly. But it could be "much more serious" if the smoke was caused by an aircraft component/system that needs repairing. That "could significantly delay certification while a solution is developed," Bernstein warned.

    More on this here.

     

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    Boeing - The making of Florida One

     

     

     

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    Some history of the JET ENGINE

     

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    The future of flight

     

    https://youtu.be/28wwfGRQc20

     

    An airplane with no window??

     

    A cockpit with no window??

     

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