It’s hard to say exactly what is going on in this video shot on Saturday over the seaside town of Wassenaar in the Netherlands, but what’s clear is cockpit cameras caught one airplane descending into the top of another, causing quite a bit of damage in the collision but luckily no injuries.
According to news reports, three airplanes were flying in formation when the incident happened. Two Aviat Huskys had been towing banners along the beach for rival political parties. The third airplane, a Cessna 172, was filming and photographing one of the Huskys when it collided with the other.
The main gear of the 172 struck the left wing of the Husky and became stuck. After about 10 seconds the airplanes managed to separate. The Husky landed on the beach with a damaged left wing and flaps (including two large holes from the other airplane’s tires), while the 172 flew to nearby Rotterdam Airport where it performed a flyby so the tower could check if its gear was still in place. It made a normal landing as rescue crews stood by.
Authorities reportedly confiscated both aircraft while the investigation in ongoing.
Washington (CNN) -- Two planes that nearly collided last month at Newark Liberty International Airport came within yards of each other, the National Transportation Safety Board said.
United Express Flight 4100, an Embraer ERJ-145 operated by ExpressJet, was cleared to take off on runway 4R at the same time United Airlines Flight 1243, a Boeing 737, was landing on the intersecting runway 29 on April 24.
On air traffic control radio captured by the website LiveATC.net, the tower can be heard telling the pilot of the 737 to "go around" and circle the airport.
The controller told the ERJ to watch out for the larger plane on the right.
"Yeah, we were putting the nose down, and, uh, he was real close," the pilot responds.
The 737 flew 135 yards away vertically and 50 yards away laterally from the smaller regional jet.
A drone has smashed into a passenger plane landing at Quebec City airport sparking safety fears.
It is the first time an unmanned flying object has collided with a commercial aircraft in Canada, the country's transport minister Marc Garneau said on Sunday.
No injuries were reported in the incident, which happened on Thursday at Jean Lesage International Airport and involved a plane belonging to Quebec-based Skyjet Aviation.
Drones are not allowed within 3.4 miles of Canadian airports, helipads and seaplane bases.
Operators who put aircraft at risk face steep fines and jail time under Canadian law.
Drone usage has soared in North America, Europe and China, raising privacy concerns and fears of collisions with commercial jets, and prompting the United Nations' aviation agency to back the creation of a single global drone registry.
There have been 1,596 drone incidents reported to Transport Canada so far this year, with 131 of them deemed to be aviation safety concerns.
A drone, similar to the one pictured, came close to colliding with a airliner over Florida, prompting fears that drones can potentially damage planes in flight.Reuters
The near-miss in March between a drone and a US Airways jet in the sky over Tallahassee appears to be the first time a commercial airliner nearly collided in midair, raising fear about the possibility of future close calls.
The Wall Street Journal reported that the pilot of the 50-seat US Airways plane told the FAA he came dangerously close to the drone as he approached the Tallahassee Regional Airport on March 22. At the time, he was flying at about 2,300 feet.
The pilot, who said he came so close with the drone he thought he hit it, described it "as a small camouflaged F-4 fixed-wing aircraft" that could have been a hobby model aircraft.
The FAA doesn't know who was operating the drone, which was painted camouflage, or whether it was government-owned or civilian-owned. The Defense Department told the Journal most military drones are not painted with camouflage. A spokesman had no other information on the incident.
The FAA has given 500 public entities such as police departments permission to fly drones. Only drones have been approved for commercial use—in Alaska.
Incident: Republic E175, Republic E170, Chautauqua E135 at Washington on Jul 31st 2012, loss of separation
A Republic Airlines Embraer ERJ-175, flight YX-3329 from Portland,ME to Washington National,DC (USA), was following the Potomac River Approach to runway 19 descending through about 1900 feet at 14:08L (18:08Z).
The aircraft had been vectored onto the river approach following a runway switch, runway 19 became active due to arriving weather after runway 01 had been active before.
A Chautauqua Airlines Embraer ERJ-135, flight RP-3071 from Washington National,DC to Columbus,OH (USA), departed runway 01 at 14:06L (18:06Z) and was climbing through about 3400 feet above the arriving aircraft at 14:08L.
A Republic Airlines Embraer ERJ-170, flight YX-3467 from Washington National,DC to Kansas City,MO (USA), also departed runway 01 at 14:07L (18:07Z) and was climbing through about 1500 feet at 14:08L in opposite direction to YX-3329.
Tower recognized the error after YX-3329 checked in, the controller asking puzzled "you are on the river?" YX-3329 was instructed to turn right onto heading 180 to avoid crossing the path of RP-3071 with further vectors provided to complete a 360 bringing the aircraft now in conflict with the departing YX-3467 prompting the tower controller to instruct the aircraft again turn onto a heading of 180 degrees, climb to 2000 feet and contact approach again, the stunned crew querying "what happened?"
The two departures were able to continue to their destinations for safe landings, YX-3329 positioned for another approach to Washington and landed safely, too.
Close call cover-up: FAA not notified jets outside Honolulu were on collision course
HONOLULU (HawaiiNewsNow) -
A mistake by an air-traffic controller resulted in two jets being put on a collision course as they approached Honolulu International Airport in January. A Hawaii News Now investigation revealed the incident was never reported to higher ups at the Federal Aviation Administration, resulting in an FAA probe and the retirement of the longtime head of air traffic control in Hawaii.
Honolulu is the 27th busiest airport in the country, with about 265,000 takeoffs and landings last year. But Honolulu air-traffic controllers handled much more traffic – roughly 654,000 flights in 2011 -- many of them flying through Hawaii air space but not landing in Honolulu.
On Saturday, Jan. 14, at about 9:09 a.m., a close call happened between a Japan Airlines 767 jet arriving from Tokyo and a United Parcel Service MD11 jet when the planes were about 15 miles west of Honolulu, both approaching HNL for a landing.
Near Mid Air Collision in Florida (Aerolineas Argentinas and American Airlines)
MIAMI (CBS4) – Very few people know it, but earlier this summer two large commercial airplanes nearly collided over the skies of South Florida.
CBS4 Investigates has learned that that close call is part of a troubling trend.
In this case, only calm and quick action by the air traffic controller saved the day.
CBS4 Investigator Stephen Stock has, for the first time, the untold story of the heroic actions in the control tower.
The air traffic controller watching the skies over Miami maintained incredible cool as near disaster almost occurred on final approach to runways 9 and 8-L.
You can hear the air traffic controller seizing control of the situation on an audio recording of the event released by the FAA at the request of CBS4 Investigates.
“Argentina 1302,” said the air traffic controller on the FAA audiotape. “You’ve gone through the final (turn) sir… turn back right. There’s traffic on final on the parallel runway.”
Despite those warnings from air traffic control, radar images also released by the FAA to CBS4 Investigates show the two dots, representing two large airplanes and about 430 lives on board nearly merge into one in the skies over Doral. The incident is what’s known in the tight circle of aviation controllers as an “NMAC,” a near mid-air collision.
Click here to to listen to air traffic control and watch the radar as the two plans come dangerously close to each other.
“Flight 1302,” said the controller on the audio tape, “You’re not descending. Maintain 3,000 (feet elevation) sir. Just maintain 3,000 and turn right, heading zero, niner zero.”
The Argentina Airlines airbus which missed the turn passed right over the top of a landing American Airlines B737.
“I need you at 3,000 sir,” said the controller to the Argentina Airlines plane, “climb and maintain 3,000 (feet.) Your approach clearance is canceled.”
Molly Welsh was the controller in control who saved the day. It’s her voice you hear on the audiotape.
“In the heat of the moment you just keep talking and keep working,” said Welsh, a veteran of 23 years in the control tower. “I quickly tried to tell him to turn back and as I was saying that I realized it was a little too late for that.”
At about 3,000 feet the Airbus 340 operated by Aerolineas Argentinas missed its turn to runway 9 over Doral and kept flying towards a course to land on runway 8-L about a mile away. The Airbus headed straight for an American Airlines 737 on final approach to land on 8-L.
It was Welsh’s voice and calm instructions that kept the two planes from colliding, averting disaster by 900 feet.
Welsh sat down and shared her story of the August 18th incident with CBS4 Investigates. It’s an incident that has not received any media attention until now.
“At first you go “Oh no!” Then you just, you instinctively do something in hopes that it keeps them apart basically,” Welsh told CBS4 Investigator Stephen Stock. “It was a little scary.”
“When I looked back and saw he had gone through the final I immediately tried to turn and I said ‘you’ve gone through turn back,’” said Welsh. “As I’m saying this I realize that it’s too late for that. He’s already right where the other aircraft is.”
A Mid-Air Collision (MAC) is an accident where two aircraft come into contact with each other while both are in flight.
Events where aircraft collide on the runway or while one is on the ground and the other in the air close to the ground are covered under Runway Incursion.
Events where aircraft collide during taxi or push-back (including collisions with parked aircraft) are covered under Ground Operations.
Events where aircraft collide with obstacles (e.g. terrain, buildings, masts, trees etc) while in flight are covered under CFIT.
Effects
Possible consequences of a MAC are temporary or permanent Loss of Control as a result of damage, avoidance maneouvre, or mis-handling, potentially resulting in collision with terrain, or an emergency landing as a result of damage to the aircraft and/or injuries to crew and passengers.
It is commonly assumed that any MAC would cause loss of both aircraft and all people on board. In fact, accident and serious incident reports show that there have been a few non-fatal MAC accidents. However, in most cases, total loss is the result.
A crash following MAC may also cause fatalities among people on the ground.
Gol Transportes Aéreos Flight 1907 (ICAO: GLO 1907) was a Boeing 737-8EH, registration PR-GTD, on a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Manaus, Brazil, to Rio de Janeiro. On 29 September 2006, at 16:56 BRT, it collided in midair with an Embraer Legacy 600 business jet over the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso. All 154 passengers and crew aboard the Boeing 737 died when the aircraft broke up in midair and crashed into an area of dense jungle, while the Embraer Legacy, despite sustaining serious damage to its left wing and tail, landed safely with its seven occupants uninjured.
Did language proficiency and language use play a contributory role in the 2006 collision of an Embraer Legacy 600 and a Boeing 737-800 over the Amazon rain forest? A linguistic analysis of the evidence provided in the accident investigation reports suggests that a number of subtle — but significant — language factors helped create an atmosphere in which a series of communication failures were allowed to develop.
However, most accident investigations — and this one was no exception — do not adequately examine language factors because accident investigators typically do not have the background training required to perceive any but the most blatant language errors.
They still talk about the horrific mid-air collision near New Delhi, India. November 12, 1996: A Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747-100B enroute to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and a Kazakhstan Airlines Ilyushin IL-76, arriving at New Delhi, collided over the village of Charki Dadri, west of the city. All 349 passengers and crew on board both flights were killed, making it the deadliest mid-air collision in which there were no survivors. The Indian government’s Lahoti Commission investigating the crash ruled that the ultimate cause of the collision was the failure of Kazakhstan Airlines Flight 1907 to follow ATC instructions. Moreover, the report stated the breach in operating procedure was due to the lack of English language skills by the Kazakhstani pilots.
Following the report, the Commission urged the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop language proficiency standards and recommendations. In 2000, ICAO formed the Proficiency Requirements in Common English Study Group. PRICESG included pilots, controllers, safety and linguistic experts familiar with the aviation world. ICAO adopted the Study Group’s recommended standards for voice communications between pilots and air traffic controllers in March 2003; the standards became applicable in March 2008.
Überlingen mid-air collision (DHL vs. Bashkirian Airlines)
The two aircraft were flying at flight level 360 (approximately 36,000 feet (11,000 m) above Mean Sea Level) on a collision course. Despite being over Germany, the airspace was controlled from Zürich, Switzerland by the private Swiss airspace control company Skyguide. The only air traffic controller handling the airspace, Peter Nielsen, was working two workstations at the same time. He did not realise the problem in time and thus failed to keep the aircraft at a safe distance from each other. Only less than a minute before the accident did he realize the danger and contacted Flight 2937, instructing the pilot to descend by a thousand feet to avoid collision with crossing traffic (Flight 611). Seconds after the Russian crew initiated the descent, however, their Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) instructed them to climb, while at about the same time the TCAS on Flight 611 instructed the pilots of that aircraft to descend. Had both aircraft followed those automated instructions, it is likely that the collision would not have occurred.[BFU 1]
Flight 611's pilots on the Boeing jet initially followed the TCAS instructions and initiated a descent, but could not immediately inform the controller due to the fact that he was dealing with Flight 2937. About eight seconds before the collision, Flight 611's descent rate was about 2,400 feet per minute (12 m/s), not as rapid as the 2,500 to 3,000 ft/min (13 to 15 m/s) range advised by TCAS. The Russian pilot on the Tupolev disregarded the TCAS instruction to climb and instead began to descend, as instructed by the controller, thus both planes were now descending.[BFU 1]
Unaware of the TCAS-issued alerts, Nielsen repeated his instruction to Flight 2937 to descend, giving the Tupolev crew incorrect information as to the position of the DHL plane. Maintenance work was being carried out on the main radar system, which meant that the controllers were forced to use a slower system.[BFU 1]
Mid-airs aren't always fatal, and all of them can be avoided. Keep up your speed, look outside and vary your aircraft's attitude to eliminate blind spots.
Few chapters in the great book of safe flying are as incomplete and misleading as guidance for avoiding mid-air collisions. In over 50 years of active flying, I have not yet seen any information accurately describing a workable method ensuring awareness and avoidance of mid-air collisions for the general aviation pilot. In fact, the FAA's well-meaning rules and guidance may be dysfunctional seeds of disaster, sown early in a pilot's flying career, later leading to a mid-air collision.
It's actually a familiar story: Concepts based on intuitive assumptions — instead of empirical knowledge — so often become concrete and immutable. The pilot's ability to see and be seen is one of the most profound of all safety myths, and understanding why pilots are not always able to meet this obligation will help avoid complacency, motivating us all to compensate for deficiencies in the system. Let's get started.
Here's The Problem
First, we need to understand why any two pilots flying their aircraft at the same speed simply cannot meet their obligation to "see and avoid" the other. The flight environment they must scan includes an entire 180-degree hemisphere—from 90 degrees out to the sides, above and below—to directly ahead. But there are blind areas beneath the cabin floor, above its ceiling and behind the wings. Additionally, scanning for traffic usually is limited in practice to the area directly ahead, perhaps within a 60-degree visual cone. This is a habit we've learned from years of driving on relatively narrow, well-defined roads and through intersections where all relevant traffic is clearly visible, more or less dead ahead of us.
Slowing down so we can more easily see and avoid is the first corollary to this mid-air myth. Here's why: When two converging aircraft are flying at close to the same speed, the scanning angle—the visual area within which all potential collision targets are located—is at its largest. The larger this area, the more likely it is we'll fail to see and avoid the other aircraft. When this area is at its largest, i.e., when the two aircraft's speeds are identical or nearly so, the blind spots also are at their largest. The larger scanning and blind areas realized when both aircraft are flying at the same speed greatly increases the mid-air collision potential.
The Big Idea
The idea here is that a higher speed ratio visually moves the collision target out in front of the faster airplane, eliminating or at least minimizing blind spots, and gives that faster airplane enhanced ability to visually acquire—and avoid—the slower one. If both airplanes are roughly co-speed, neither has the absolute ability to visually acquire, and subsequently avoid, the other. This is because of unavoidable blind spots above and below the cockpit and wings, and—through habit and practice—failure to look left and right a full 90 degrees for potential collision targets. But, you ask, if I'm going so much faster, isn't there a greater probability that I won't see the target in time? No.
First of all, the slower target will be in your field of vision, not in one of your blind spots. Second, as you close on the target, at half the distance it will be four times as large in your windscreen; at one-third the distance the target will be nine times as large. The idea, of course, is to miss him. How much you miss him rarely matters, but having the ability to control the situation by having him in your "scan-demand" cone, thus affording easier visual acquisition, is all-important. The higher the relative speed, the narrower the scan-demand angle (visual cone) within which the target will be located, and the more frequently (and thoroughly) that field can be checked. Once acquired, only a small change of direction is required to miss him.
Comments (0)
You don't have permission to comment on this page.