activity on the field, fire brigade training exercises and interventions, vehicles on the field, braking action and visibility, traffic information, start-up, towing equipment, engine checks, remote holding pattern, holding point, runway infringement, delays, stuck in the mud, damage caused by vehicles on the ground, no entry disregarded, collisions, vehicle or plane breakdown, damage to beacons, foreign objects (name, description), problems boarding or disembarking passengers, baggage identification, means of disembarking, health services, handicapped/sick passengers, parking position/space
Airfield facilities/installations
ILS, radar, VOR, etc., lighting systems, reliability of radio aids, direction finder, poor visibility equipment, aprons/tarmac/ramps, runways, taxiways, length and width of runway, parking zone, holding area, terminal, cargo area, bearing strength
Ground services
opening hours, availability of services at night, assistance on the ground, safety altitude, passengers/people on board, unserviceable equipment (stairs, luggage trolleys, etc.), auxiliary power unit, de-icing, refuelling, delay due to de-icing or refuelling, bird scaring, towing, firefighting methods, safety services, medial assistance, baggage handling
Activities on the field
change of runway and pattern, ramp vehicles, snow fearing, sweeping, mowing, harvesting, closure, opening of runway access roads, runway inspection
Something went wrong while loading this 727 at MIA on February 29, 2004. Nobody was hurt, and the plane was righted about 15 minutes after this shot was taken.
A catering truck collided with the aircraft just underneath the aft right hand passenger door causing damage to the aft fuselage, as result of the impact the aircraft rotated causing the nose of the aircraft to move about 5 meters to the right. This created a gap between the jetway connected to the left hand forward passenger door, a flight attendant just boarding the aircraft for the next sector fell from the left hand forward door and received serious injuries. The door and jetway also collided as result of the impact by the truck resulting in damage to the left hand door.
On runways and taxiways, pilots usually navigate using paper maps. Air traffic controllers perform the surveillance task, primarily on the ‘see and be seen’ principle. Radio voice transmission is still used as the primary means of communication.
When visibility conditions degrade, pilots are less capable of following the cleared taxi route, in addition to seeing and avoiding each other. Even in cases of improved visibility, it is often challenging at large airports to recognise the allocated rollway quickly and safely. Due to complex layouts and unclear radio communications, there is a significant chance of runway incursion incidences.
However, improved capacity and enhanced levels of safety can be achieved through the adoption of intelligent guidance procedures, such as ‘follow the greens’, where advanced surface movement guidance control systems (A-SMGCS) can be built using hardware and software that are already available.
These systems use taxiway lighting to direct the crew and the aircraft. Each segment of taxiway needed is switched on. All other areas not needed are switched off.
Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning System (ARIWS)
An Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning System (ARIWS) is a system which provides autonomous detection of a potential incursion or of the occupancy of an active runway and a direct warning to a flight crew or a vehicle operator (ICAO).
An ARIWS operates based on a surveillance system which is designed and sited to monitor the existing situation on a runway and which automatically transmits this information to warning lights located at both the runway takeoff threshold and at selected runway entrances. The system provides warnings as follows:
When an aircraft arriving at a runway is short final or one departing from the runway has commenced its takeoff roll, red warning lights at the runway entrances will illuminate, indicating that it is unsafe to enter or cross the runway.
When an aircraft on the runway threshold awaiting takeoff and another aircraft or vehicle enters or crosses the runway, red warning lights will illuminate at the threshold area, indicating that it is unsafe to commence the takeoff roll.
Read more about this and much more concerning runway incursions on Skybrary
TRB’s Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Synthesis 29: Ramp Safety Practices addresses the current state of ground handling practices, focusing on safety measures and training.
Issues addressed in the report include ramp safety operations, staff roles and responsibilities, safety training, audit and inspection programs, safety violation programs, and collaborative safety initiatives, such as foreign object debris programs.
Accident: KLM B744 at Amsterdam on Nov 30th 2010, collision with de-icing platform, de-icer injured
By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Dec 1st 2010 14:15Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 1st 2010 22:20Z
Sample of de-icing truck in Amsterdam (Photo: Safeaero)
A KLM Boeing 747-400, registration PH-BFB performing flight KL-785 from Amsterdam (Netherlands) to Saint Maarten (Dutch Antilles) with 240 passengers, had been de-iced at a remote stand and was moving out of the stand and turning, when the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer hit the still partly extended hydraulic lift of a de-icing vehicle and knocked the vehicle over, so that the cabin at the top of the hydraulic lift crashed to the ground. Emergency services needed an hour to get the man out. The de-icer received serious injuries including two fractures of his spine, but is in stable condition. The aircraft received substantial damage to its tailplane requiring the replacement of the horizontal stabilizer assembly.
The passengers disembarked and were put onto a replacement Boeing 747-400 registration PH-BFL, that reached St. Maarten with a delay of 4 hours.
The exact sequence of events is still under investigation.
3-7-2. TAXI AND GROUND MOVEMENT OPERATIONS Issue the route for the aircraft/vehicle to follow on the movement area in concise and easy to understand terms. The taxi clearance must include the specific route to follow. When a taxi clearance to a runway is issued to an aircraft, confirm the aircraft has the correct runway assignment. NOTE- 1. A pilot's read back of taxi instructions with the runway assignment can be considered confirmation of runway assignment. 2. Movement of aircraft/vehicles on nonmovement areas is the responsibility of the pilot, the aircraft operator, or the airport management.
a.When authorizing an aircraft/vehicle to proceed on the movement area, or to any point other than assigned takeoff runway, specify the route/taxi instructions. If it is the intent to hold the aircraft/vehicle short of any given point along the taxi route, issue the route and then state the holding instructions.
NOTE- 1. The absence of holding instructions authorizes an aircraft/vehicle to cross all taxiways that intersect the taxi route. 2. Movement of aircraft/vehicles on nonmovement areas is the responsibility of the pilot, the aircraft operator, or the airport management. Phraseology, no change.
EXAMPLE- “Cross Runway Two Eight Left, hold short of Runway Two Eight Right.” “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed to the hangar.” “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed straight ahead then via ramp to the hangar.” “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed on Taxiway Charlie, hold short of Runway Two Seven.” or “Taxi/continue taxing/proceed on Charlie, hold short of Runway Two Seven.”
b. When authorizing an aircraft to taxi to an assigned takeoff runway, state the departure runway followed by the specific taxi route. Issue hold short restrictions when an aircraft will be required to hold short of a runway or other points along the taxi route.
PHRASEOLOGY- “Runway (number) taxi via (route as necessary).” or “Runway (number) taxi via (route as necessary)(hold short instructions as necessary).” EXAMPLE- “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via taxiway Alpha, hold short of taxiway Charlie.” or “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Alpha, hold short of Charlie.” or “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via taxiway Alpha, hold short of Runway Two Seven Right.” or “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Charlie, cross Runway Two Seven Left, hold short of Runway Two Seven Right.” or “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Alpha, Charlie, cross Runway One Zero.”
c. Aircraft/vehicles must receive a runway crossing clearance for each runway that their taxi route crosses. An aircraft/vehicle must have crossed a previous runway before another runway crossing clearance may be issued.
NOTE A runway crossing clearance is required to cross or operate on any active/inactive or closed runway. EXAMPLE- “Cross Runway One Six Left, hold short of Runway One Six Right.”
d. When an aircraft/vehicle is instructed to “follow” traffic and requires a runway crossing, issue a runway crossing clearance in addition to the follow instructions and/or hold short instructions, as applicable.
EXAMPLE- “Follow (traffic), cross Runway Two Seven Right.” or “Follow (traffic), cross Runway Two Seven Right, hold short Runway Two Seven Left.”
e. At those airports where the taxi distance between runway centerlines is less than 1,000 feet, multiple runway crossings may be issued with a single clearance. The air traffic manager must submit a request to the appropriate Terminal Services Director of Operations for approval before authorizing multiple runway crossings.
REFERENCEFAAO JO 7210.3, Para 10-3-10 MULTIPLE RUNWAY CROSSINGS
Based on data developed by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Foundation estimates that 27,000 ramp accidents and incidents — one per 1,000 departures — occur worldwide every year. About 243,000 people are injured each year in these accidents and incidents; the injury rate is 9 per 1,000 departures.
Ramp accidents cost major airlines worldwide at least US$10 billion a year, the data indicates. These accidents affect airport operations, result in personnel injuries, and damage aircraft, facilities and ground-support equipment.
The Foundation decided this was a safety threat that had to be answered. In 2003, the Foundation launched the Ground Accident Prevention (GAP) program in response.
The GAP program developed information and products in a practical format — “e-tools” — designed to eliminate accidents and incidents on airport ramps (aprons) and adjacent taxiways, and during the movement of aircraft into and out of hangars.
Citing 12 accident investigations since 1993, the NTSB has issued a Safety Recommendation to the FAA for installation of anti-collision aids, like onboard camera systems, to help pilots with clearance issues during taxi. The Board says preliminary information collected in its investigations show that pilots of large aircraft cannot easily see the aircraft's wingtips from the cockpit. It found that in aircraft like the 747, 757, 767, 777 and the Airbus A380 pilots must literally stick their heads out of the window to see the airplane's wingtips, noting that this "is often impractical." The recommendation notes that the Airbus A380 superjumbo is already equipped with an external camera system, and why that system is insufficient in addressing the Board's concerns.
According to the NTSB each of 12 accidents referenced by the letter involved situations in which pilots "were either unable to determine or had difficulty determining the separation" between their aircraft's wingtips and another object while taxiing. The recommendation states that the accidents "highlight the need" for aids that to help pilots with the problem of sometimes moving obstacles they may encounter on the ground. The A380 is equipped with an External Taxi Aid Camera System consisting of two cameras -- one on the belly and one on the vertical fin. The intent of the belly camera is to display the position of the landing gear before and during taxi and to provide "an external landscape." The vertical fin camera displays a field of view that does not extend to the aircraft's wingtips but shows most of the fuselage, and the jet's wings from outboard engine to outboard engine. The NTSB recommends that a system that displays wingtips and wingtip paths -- not unlike the backup camera in some modern cars -- be installed on all newly manufactured large airplanes where the wingtips are not easily visible from the cockpit. See the full recommendation here (PDF).
Pacific Blue Boeing 737-800 on behalf of Virgin Australia, registration VH-VUM performing flight DJ-4197 from Brisbane,QL (Australia) to Denpasar Bali (Indonesia), was preparing for departure from the international terminal at Brisbane around 10:00L (00:00Z) with the first officer conducting his walk around to inspect the aircraft and walking over the mobile aluminium stairs providing access to the Boeing 737.
A Qantas Boeing 747-400, registration VH-OEH performing flight QF-8 from Brisbane,QL to Sydney,NS (Australia), was taxiing for departure at that time, when the engine exhaust of the Jumbo blew the mobile stairs attached to the 737 over sending the first officer down onto the tarmac, the first officer received a broken leg and a broken arm.
Citing 12 accident investigations since 1993, the NTSB has issued a Safety Recommendation to the FAA for installation of anti-collision aids, like onboard camera systems, to help pilots with clearance issues during taxi. The Board says preliminary information collected in its investigations show that pilots of large aircraft cannot easily see the aircraft's wingtips from the cockpit. It found that in aircraft like the 747, 757, 767, 777 and the Airbus A380 pilots must literally stick their heads out of the window to see the airplane's wingtips, noting that this "is often impractical." The recommendation notes that the Airbus A380 superjumbo is already equipped with an external camera system, and why that system is insufficient in addressing the Board's concerns.
According to the NTSB each of 12 accidents referenced by the letter involved situations in which pilots "were either unable to determine or had difficulty determining the separation" between their aircraft's wingtips and another object while taxiing. The recommendation states that the accidents "highlight the need" for aids that to help pilots with the problem of sometimes moving obstacles they may encounter on the ground. The A380 is equipped with an External Taxi Aid Camera System consisting of two cameras -- one on the belly and one on the vertical fin. The intent of the belly camera is to display the position of the landing gear before and during taxi and to provide "an external landscape." The vertical fin camera displays a field of view that does not extend to the aircraft's wingtips but shows most of the fuselage, and the jet's wings from outboard engine to outboard engine. The NTSB recommends that a system that displays wingtips and wingtip paths -- not unlike the backup camera in some modern cars -- be installed on all newly manufactured large airplanes where the wingtips are not easily visible from the cockpit. See the full recommendation here (PDF).
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